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In this paper we analyze the optimum behavior of a person who is forced 
to make a decision, or a set of decisions, before a specified deadline. We 
attempt to treat in considerable detail a very simple, yet perhaps not un- 
realistic, situation as an illustration, but the reader should have no difficulty 
in envisaging further ramifications and applications. Even with the simple 
model we choose there are unexpected mathematical delicacies and difficulties 
which we have thought it worthwhile to analyze. 
As an aid to intuition we have phrased the problem we consider as one of a 
merchant selling goods to the public walking past his store. While we do not 
claim that our results have a realistic significance for him, it will be apparent 
that the type of decisions with with he is confronted have manifold extensions 
to other areas and activities and have, in a simplified way, many features in 
common with the model we treat. 
Though our problem could, no doubt, be formulated as one of an optimum 
inventory type or as an example of a dynamic programming problem [l] 
we have developed it independently in the present paper, which assumes no 
background in these subjects. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Let us consider the following situation. A seller has a stock of goods to 
dispose of within a specified time. Potential buyers arrive in accordance with 
a Poisson process, and the probability distribution of prices they are willing 
* This work was partially supported by the Office of Naval Research. Some of the 
material in this paper appeared in unpublished form in a report, “A type of inventory 
problem,” by W. M. Kincaid and D. A. Darling, issued as Report M720-lR33 by the 
Engineering Research Institute, University of Michigan (1952). 
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to pay is known to the seller, who attempts to set his prices so as to maximize 
his expected cash receipts during the sa1e.l 
Two variants of this situation are of interest. In the first, the seller posts a 
price for each item in his stock. In the second, the seller does not post prices, 
but receives offers from potential buyers, which he either accepts or rejects. 
Although the first case is closer to the usual commercial practice, the second 
is simpler mathematically, and will be treated first. 
Although the principles developed are undoubtedly capable of wider 
application, attention will be confined to the case where all the items in the 
seller’s stock are the same and no buyer is interested in purchasing more than 
one item. Under these circumstances, the situation is sufficiently described 
by stating that the expected number of potential buyers appearing during 
any time interval of length T is AT, where h is a positive constant, and that 
the probability that a potential buyer appearing at time t prior to the con- 
clusion of the sale is not willing to pay as many as z monetary units for an 
item is a specified function O(Z, t). (H ereafter potential buyers will be referred 
to simply as buyers.) While one might suppose that the duration of the sale 
and the number of items held by the seller at its outset would be relevant 
parameters, it will turn out that this is true only in a trivial sense. 
The assumption that the average rate of arrival of buyers is fixed is really 
a very mild one, since the time scale could be expanded or compressed locally 
if desired. In fact, we shall take advantage of this freedom forthwith by 
declaring the time scale so chosen that X = 1. 
II. SOME USEFUL LEMMAS 
It will be convenient to present at this point some mathematical results 
that will be referred to repeatedly later. The proofs involve only elementary 
arguments and will not be given here. 
LEMMA 1. Let f  be a function such that for a 5 t < b 
f(t) = s” q’(x) dx + 5(t) , a 
where ‘P and 5 are real-era&d functions satisfying the following conditions on 
[a, 4 
1 This statement implies that unsold items are worthless to the seller. If in fact they 
have fixed salvage values, the situation is changed only verbally, with the difference 
between the selling price and the salvage value taking the role played by the selling 
price in the present discussion. 
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(1) Y is integrable; 
(2) 5 is monotone increasing and continuous, and [(a) 2 0. Then f  is non- 
negative on [a, b], unless both f(t) < 0 and Y(t) < 0 on a common set of positive 
measure. 
LEMMA 2. Let the conditions of Lemma 1 be satisjed, and suppose further 
that Y(t) = f(t) 9(t) + O(t), where # and 0 are measurable and bounded, 
+(t) < 0, and e(t) 2 0. Let t, be any point of (a, b]. Then either f(t,) > 0 or 
0(t) = t(t) = 0 for almost all t in [a, t,], in which case f(t) = 0 for a 5 t 5 t,. 
LEMMA 3. Let f  be a function having a derivative f’ on [a, b], and let 
f(a) 2 0. Then th e o f  II owing statements may be made for a < t I b: 
(a) Either f(t) 2 0 for all t, or f(t) < 0 and f’(t) < 0 for some t. 
(b) Either f(t) > 0 for all t, or f(t) < 0 a&f’(t) < 0 for some t. 
(c) Iff’(u) > min [- Af(u), O]forsomeA > Oandf(u) f  Ofora I u I t, 
then f(t) > 0. 
III. SALE OF A SINGLE ITEM, SELLING PRICE NOT ANNOUNCED 
A natural starting point for the discussion is the case where the seller’s 
initial stock consists of one item. It will turn out that little in the way of 
additional ideas is required to handle the general case once the optimal pricing 
policy for a single item is determined. 
As noted earlier, we shall begin by supposing that the seller does not quote 
a price, but decides whether or not to accept each buyer’s offer when it is 
made. 
Intuitively, one might argue as follows. Let Z(t) be the least offer that the 
seller would accept at time t prior to the end of the sale, and let E(t) be the 
seller’s expected gain from a sale of duration t. For the sake of simplicity, the 
value of the item to the seller will be taken as zero if it remains unsold, so that 
E(0) = 0; no real loss of generality results from this assumption. Then it is 
reasonable to suppose that under an optimal pricing policy Z(t) = E(t); 
that is, the item will be sold only if the amount offered is at least equal to the 
expected amount that will ultimately be received for it if the offer is rejected. 
Although the conclusion just stated is correct, the argument is clearly not 
rigorous, and embodies an apparent circularity, for E(t) is not known in 
advance, but depends on Z(t), which is what we are trying to determine. 
To establish the optimality of a particular pricing policy, which will 
henceforth be referred to as a strategy, a class of admissible strategies must 
first be specified. For this purpose, any rule giving the probability with 
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which the seller will accept an offer of any given amount at any given time 
will be called an admissible strategy. That is, any (measurable) function 
p(x, t) with domain x I’, 0, t 0 and range 0 -:: p I I defines a strategy; 
for convenience, the function associated with a strategy s will be written 
p(s; z, t). Thus if the strategy s is followed, the seller will accept an offer z 
at time t prior to the end of the sale with probability p(s, x, t). 
The set of admissible strategies is very broad, since the seller is not 
required to accept all offers above some lower limit, and may even let accept- 
ance or rejection hinge on the toss of a coin. Although it might seem more 
natural to restrict attention to “reasonable” strategies, the proofs to be given 
below would not be substantially simplified by doing so-indeed, the 
essential ideas would emerge less clearly. (Note, incidentally, that any 
strategy is applicable to a sale of arbitrary duration.) 
Since the end of the sale is the most convenient temporal reference point, 
it will be understood henceforth that “the time t” means t time units before 
the sale ends, and other expressions referring to time are to be interpreted 
similarly. 
In the following discussion, we shall frequently have occasion to use 
Stieljes integrals with respect to the distribution 8(z, t), with t held fixed. 
(Note that 0 is left continuous in z, so that such a Stieljes integral will include 
the jump, if any, at the lower end-point.) For simplicity, the differential 
symbol will be written d&z, t) in such cases. For example, the expected 
total value of offers received between the times T, and T, (0 I T, I TJ 
is given by the integral 
Tz m 
s s z d,B(z, t) dt. TI 0 (3.1) 
(This integral will be assumed to exist for all nonnegative values of T, and 
T,. It will also be assumed that the value of the inner integral will not exceed 
a positive constant M for all values of t to be considered.) 
Now suppose the seller follows the strategy s. I f  the sale item is unsold at 
time t + At, the probability P that it will be sold by time t satisfies the 
inequality 
t+Llt m
P< s s p(s; x, x) d,f+, 3) dx, t 0 (3.2) 
since the right member is the expected number of sales that would take place 
if the number of sale items was unlimited. On the other hand, if 
P% (K = 2, 3, **a) is the probability that K sales would take place in this case, 
the right member of (3.2) is equal to P + 2P, + 3P, + -a*. Since for 
R = 1, 2, -a*, the probability that exactly K buyers appear during the time 
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interval is ePAt ( dt)“/K! and the probability that R or more sales take place is at 
most equal to the probability that k or more buyers appear, a few manipula- 
tions lead to the inequality 
2P, + 3P, + *.a < At( 1 - e-At) < (Llt)2, 
and thus to the lower bound 
(3.3) 
t+At m  
P> 
s s 
p(s; z, x) d,B(z, x) ax - (dt)2. (3.4) 
t 0 
Similar considerations can be applied to the estimation of the expected 
value E of payments received (for the single item) during the same period, 
and lead to the bounds 
t+At m  
0-C I s zp(s; x, x) d&z, x) dx - E’ < M(dQ2, (3.5) t 0 
where M is an upper bound to the expected amount offered by a random 
buyer, as noted above. 
The expected amount received by the seller during a sale of length t will 
now be considered; it will be denoted by E(s, t). Referring again to the inter- 
val [t, t + At] and using the notation introduced above, one has the relation 
E(s, t + At) = E + (1 - P) E(s, t). W) 
Since E(s, t) 2 0, the inequalities (3.2), (3.4), and (3.5) may be substituted 
into (3.6) to yield 
t+At m  s I [zi - E(s, t)] p(s; z, x) d,B(z, x) dx - M(d t)2 < E(s, t + At) - E(s, t) t 0 
< ,:,,, jr [x - E(s, t)] $(s; z, x) d&z, x) dx + E(s, t) (A t)2. (3.7) 
From (3.1) the expected value of the total offers received between times 
t and 0 is J: Jr zd,O( z x , ) d x, which does not exceed Mt; consequently 
E(s, t) < Mt for any strategy s. The inequalities (3.7) can be strengthened 
by making use of this fact and dropping positive and negative terms from the 
left and right members, respectively, yielding 
t-tAt m  
-Mt 
s s 
p(s; z, x) d&z, x) dx - M(d t)2 < E(s, t + At) - E(s, t) 
t 0 
t+At cc 
< 
.r s 
xp(s; z, x) d&‘(z, x) dx + Mt(d t)2. 
t 0 
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Since 
and 
we obtain the further result 
- Mtdt - M(b)2 < E(s, t + At) - E(s, t) < MLlt + Mt(Llt)2. (3.8) 
Since dt is a factor of both the left and right members of (3.8), it follows 
that if upper bounds T and 6 are placed on t and At, a constant K can be 
found such that E(s, t) satisfies the Lipschitz condition 
IE(s,t+At)-E(s,t)I<KAt (3.9) 
whenever t < T and At < 6. 
It follows from (3.9) that replacing E(s, t) by E(s, x) in the integral appearing 
in the left and right members of (3.7) changes the value of the integral by at 
most 
s 
t+A t 
t 
K(x - t) dx = ; (At)2. 
Combining this result with (3.7) leads to the relation 
j -% t + 4 - -%, t) - jTt j,” [z - E(s, x)] p(s; z, x) d&z, x) dx j 
< (+ + M + E(s, t)) (At)2 < ($ + M + MT) (At)“. (3.10) 
Now let the interval [0, t] with t < T be divided into K subintervals of length 
t/k < 6. Applying (3.10) to each interval and adding the results yields 
( E(s, t) - j: j,” [z - E(s, x)1 P(S; z, 4 &Q, 4 dx / 
<($+M+MT);. 
This inequality holds for all sufficiently large values of k, and it follows 
that the left member must be identically zero. Moreover, the restriction 
t < T has no real force, since T may be made arbitrarily large. Accordingly 
we have the result 
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THEOREM 1. For all strategies s and all times t 2 0, the expectation E(s, t) 
satisjies the equation 
E(s, t) = j: j; [z - E(s, x)] p(s; z, x) d,0(x, x) dx. (3.11) 
While it is possible to find an explicit expression for E(s, t)-in fact the 
formula 
E(s, t) = 1: ,r z PCS; z, u> d,W u) exp (- ,I sy P(S; z, x) d,%, 4 dx) du 
(3.12) 
holds-Eq. (3.11) is more useful for present purposes. 
It is now possible to establish the form of the optimal strategy. Equation 
(3.11) suggests that E(s, t) will be maximal if p(s; z, x) = 1 when z > E(s, x) 
and p(s; z, x) = 0 when x < E(s, x). This remark is in harmony with the 
conjecture advanced in Section III. Theorems 2 and 3 below embody the 
result in precise form. 
The exposition will be simplified by introducing new notations that will 
permit the Stieljes integrals to be replaced by ordinary integrals. In effect 
this is done by setting y = 19(x, t), and regarding z as a function of y and t 
defined by this relation. Discontinuities in 6 are taken care of by the formal 
definition 
(3.12) 
With this notation (3.11) becomes 
-W, 4 = 1; 1: [z - E(s, x)1 P(S; z, x) dy dx, (3.13) 
with the understanding that z represents z(y, x) as defined by (3.12). 
THEOREM 2. There exists a strategy CI such that 
p(u;z, t) = 1 when z 2 JqJ, t), 
= 0 when z < E(a, t). (3.14) 
PROOF. Choose any strategy s, and define a new strategy s1 by 
p(s*; z, t> = 1 for z 2 E(s, t>, 
= 0 for z < E(z, 5). 
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We shall show that sr is an improvement on s. It follows from Theorem 1 that 
- [x ~ E(s, x)] p(s; z, x)} dy dx. 
Suppose E(s, , t) < E(s, t). Then if z 2 E(s, t), we have 
If z < E(s, t), then p(si; Z, t) = 0 and [x - E(s, t)] p(s; x, t) 5 0. In either 
case the integrand is nonnegative and the conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied 
with f(t) = E(s, , t) - E(s, t). Thus E(s, , t) 2 E(s, t) for all t 2 0. 
Now repeat the operation, defining the strategy s2 by 
P(% z, t) = 1 for x 2 qs, , t), 
=o for x < E(s, , t). 
Then by the same reasoning E(s, , t) 2 E(s, , t), Continuing in this way, we 
define s, by 
p(sn;x,t)= 1 for z 2 E(L, , t), 
= 0 for z < E(s,-, , t). 
Thus for any t 2 0, the sequence {E(sn , t)> is monotone increasing, and 
since it is obviously bounded limn+a, E(a) t) exists; call it E(t). Since the 
functions E(sn , t) are continuous and satisfy a uniform Lipschitz condition, 
the same is true of E(t). 
We may now define the strategy cr either by 
or by 
p(o;z,t)= 1 for .zf 2 qq, 
= 0 for z < E(t). 
It remains to show that E(o, t) = E(t). Since {p(s,; Z, t)}, 71 = 1, 2, ***, 
is a monotone decreasing sequence for all z > 0 and t > 0, the sequence 
which represents the expected number of acceptable offers received during 
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[0, t] if the strategy s, is followed, is also monotone decreasing; its limit 
must be Ji Jip(u; Z, x) dy dx. The difference 
t ss l [P(sn; 2, x) - P(U ; z, x)] dy dx 0 0 
is the expected number of offers that would be accepted under the strategy s, 
but rejected under u, and is thus an upper bound to the probability a, that 
the sale item will be sold (under the strategy s,J in response to such an offer. 
If such a sale takes place, the payment is necessarily less than maxO <5 it E(x), 
which in turn cannot exceed Mt. Hence E(sn , t) satisfies the inequalities 
(1 - 4 E(u, t) 5 qsn 7 t) < (1 - a,) E(o, t) + u,Mt. 
Since lim,,, a, = 0, it follows that E(u, t) = limndm E(sn , t) = E(t), 
completing the proof. 
We shall now show that u is optimal, not only with respect to the sequence 
{sn}, but with respect to the set of all admissible strategies. Indeed, we shall 
show that it is the only optimal strategy (except for a set of measure zero). 
Incidentally, this implies that the choice of s in the above proof does not 
affect U. 
THEOREM 3. A strategy s is optimal ;f  and only if p(s; 2, t) = p(u; z, t) 
except on a set of probability measure zero, where u is any strategy satisfying 
(3.14). 
PROOF. Let s be any strategy. By Theorem 1 
ECU, t> - w 0 = j: j: {[z - E(u, x)] p(u; z, x) 
- [x - E(s, x)1 ~(s; ~3 x)> dy dx 
= 
ss 1 1 {[qs, x) - ECU, x)1 Pk z, x) 
+ [x - E(u, x)1 [P(u, ~7 x) - ~(s; 2, x)1> dr dx. 
If z 2 E(u, x), then by (3.14) p(u; Z, x) = 1 2 p(s; 2, x); similarly 
z < E(u, x) implies p(0; Z, x) = 0 5 p( s; Z, x). It follows that the conditions 
of Lemma 2 are satisfied withf(t) = E(u, t) - E(s, t). Hence E(u, t) 2 E(s, t), 
and the equality holds only if p(s; Z, t) = p(u; Z, t) except on a set of (pro- 
bability) measure zero, as was to be proved. 
The optrmal strategy u was defined as the limit of a sequence of strategies. 
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Since we have proved that E(cs, t) = sups E(s, t), we may convert (3.14) into 
the more elegant definition 
p(o;z,t)= I if 27 2 “yJ qs, q, 
zz 0 if x < s;p E(s, t). (3.15) 
In view of the above results, we may simplify our notation by writting 
E(t) for E(a, t); we shall refer to E(t) as the expectation for a sale of length i.2 
It follows from Theorem I and (3.14) that E(t) satisfies the integral equa- 
tion 
and this gives us a means of determining E(r) in a particular case. Consider 
for example, the uniform distribution of z represented by 
qz, 2) = 2, Olxll, 
=I z > 1. 
Here (3.16) becomes 
E(t) = l‘t 1’ [z - E(x)] dz dx 
0 EkEI 
or 
E’(t) = +/;ct, [z - E(t)] dz = &[l - E(t)12. 
Solving (3.18) subject to the condition E(0) = 0 gives us 
E(t) = & . 
(3.17) 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
In this example E(t) has a continuous derivative. It is natural to ask whether 
this situation is typical, While it follows from (3.16) that E(t) must have a 
s Some of the ideas presented here may be expressed in terms of concepts introduced 
by Dubins and Savage in a forthcoming book. In particular, the utiZity of the seller’s 
position at time t can be defined as the selling price if the item has been sold, and as 
sup, E(s, t) otherwise. Corresponding to a given situation at time t, there will be an 
expected utility at any subsequent time t’ that depends on the strategy followed between 
t and t’. Theorem 3 may be regarded as expressing the fact that the expected utility 
cannot exceed the initial utility, and will equal it only if an optimal strategy is followed. 
There is also a relationship with the principle of optimal&y enunciated by Bellman 
61, P. 831. 
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derivative almost everywhere it is apparent that irregularities in 0(x, t) as a 
function of t may induce irregularities in this derivative. It will be shown, 
however, that if 8 is well-behaved to the extent of satisfying a uniform 
Lipschitz condition with respect to t, then E(t) will have a continuous 
derivative, regardless of the character of 0 as a function of z. 
By (3.16) E(t) is an integral of the function 
E’(t) = ,;(t, [z - E(t)1 4q.5 0, (3.20) 
which, it will be noted, is nonnegative. Replacing t by t + At in (3.20), 
subtracting (3.20) and adding and subtracting suitable terms leads to 
wt + At) - E’(t) = !I( t+d t)[Z - qt + d t)] d,eg, t + d 2) 
s 
m - cz - qt + At)] d,e(z, t)E( t+d t)
+ L+,t, [E(t) - qt + 41 d,e(z, t)
I 
E(t+dt) - b - E(t)] 4+, 9. (3.21) 
E(t) 
As At --f 0, the difference of the first two integrals in (3.21) approaches 0 if 0 
satisfied a uniform Lipschitz condition in t, while the other two integrals 
approach 0 because E(t) is continuous. Thus we have the result: 
THEOREM 4. If  8(x, 2) t’ji sa 1s es a uniform Lipschitz condition in t for all z, 
the optimal expectation E(t) has a continuous nonnegative derivative E’(t) 
satisfying the relation (3.20). 
IV. SALE OF A SINGLE ITEM, SELLINGPRICE ANNOUNCED 
Let the situation be the same as in the preceding section, except that the 
seller is required to announce a price, which can be a function of t, at which 
he will sell the single item he holds. 
Our first objective will be to develop an analogue of Theorem 1. As in the 
proof of that theorem, a passage to a limit is required; since this part of the 
argument involves no new ideas, it will not be presented in detail. Instead, 
symbols like O(dt)2 will be used where appropriate. 
The sale price at time t associated with a strategy s will be denoted by 
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Z(s, t), and the corresponding expectation by F(s, t). If the item is unsold 
at time t + At, the probability that a sale will take place by time t under this 
strategy is 
d&z, x) dx + O(d t)” 
=s &-At (1 - 6[Z(s, x) x]} dx + O(b)’ t (4.1) 
while the expected amount received is 
s t+At E= Z(s, x) (1 - O[.Z(s, x), x]} dx + O(dt)2. (4.2) t
(It is assumed that all integrals exist; also our earlier assumption of an upper 
bound implies that the integrand in (4.2) will not exceed M.) For convenience, 
we shall write 
c$(x, t) = 1 - e(s, t). (4.3) 
Equation (3.6), suitably reinterpreted, is valid here. Substituting from (4.1), 
(4.2), and (4.3) in (3.6) y ie Id s as the analogue of (3.7) the relation 
F(s, t + At) - F(s, t) 
= 
s 
t+At [Z(s, x) - F(s, t)] +[Z(s, x), x] dx + O(dt)2. (4.4) 
+ 
Following our earlier reasoning, we conclude that F(s, t) satisfies a Lipschitz 
condition, and are led to the result stated below. 
THEOREM 5. The expected gain F(s, t) associated with the pricing function 
Z(s, t) satisfies the relation 
F(s, t> = 1; [Z(s, x) i F(s, 41 (b[Z(s, x), x] dx. (4.5) 
To maximize F(s, t), it would seem that the integrand in (4.5) should be 
made as large as possible. Accordingly, for an arbitrarily chosen strategy s we 
shall define a modified strategy sr by choosing Z(s, , t) to be the least value of z 
for which the expression [z - F(s, t)] +(z, t) attains its maximum value. 
(Since +(z, t) is left continuous and monotone decreasing in a, the maximum 
is attained for each t). 
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To show that sr is an improvement on s, we substitute in (4.5) to obtain 
- [Z(s, 4 - F(s, 41 +[Z(s, x),4> dx. 
(4.6) 
Now suppose F(s, , t) < F(s, t). Then Z(s, , t) - F(s, , t) > Z(s, , t) - F(s , t). 
Also, the definition of Z(s, , t) implies that 
[ml , t) - qs, 91 ~[Z(s, 9 0, 4 2 [-qs, t) - F(s, 01 #[Z(s, 0, 4. 
Combining these inequalities shows that the integrand in (4.6) is positive 
for x = t. Consequently Lemma 1 is applicable, and leads to the conclusion 
that F(s, , t) 2 F(s, t) for all t. 
As in the proof of Theorem 2, we may repeat the operation, defining a 
sequence of strategies sa , sa , a*. such that {F(sn , t)}, n = 1, 2, .a., constitutes 
a monotone increasing sequence for all t 2 0, having a limit p(t) as n -+ 00. 
The sequence {Z(s, , t)} is also monotone increasing. To see this, let us 
write 
G(x, t) = mzp 1(x - 4 4(x, t)> (4.7) 
for x 2 0, and denote by 5(x, t) the least value off: for which the maximum 
is attained. 
LEMMA 4. The function 5 is monotone increasing and left continuous in x 
for t 2 0, x > 0. 
PROOF. Suppose x1 < z2, and that for some value x0 of x the inequality 
holds. Since +(.zI , t) 2 $(~a , t), (4.8) will also hold for all x > x,, . Since 
(4.8) will be true for all z1 < z2 if z2 = 4(x, t) and will be false for some 
z1 < za if xg > [(x, t), we see that aI < 5(x,, , t) implies .a1 < 5(x, t) for 
x > x,, . Thus 5 is monotone increasing in X. 
Now let a,, = limz+z,+, 5(x, t) be the limit of [(x, t) as x approaches x0 
from below. Since the definition of 5(x, t) implies the ineqaulity 
(x - 4 d(% t) 5 (5(x, t> - 4 $[5(x, 91 
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for all z, x, t, it follows from the monotonicity of 5 and the left continuity 
of 4 that for all z, x, t 
The inequality (4.9) implies that [(x,, , t) I zs; since 5 is monotone increasing, 
5(%, t) 2 %I; thus 5(x,, , t) = z0 , and the left continuity of 5 is established. 
Incidentally, it is clear that 5(x, t) 2 x in all cases. 
Since Z(s, , t) = [[F(s,-, , t)] for n = 2, 3, **. and {F(sn , t)> is a monotone 
increasing sequence, it follows from Lemma 4 that {Z(s, , t)} is a monotone 
increasing sequence for all t 2 0 and that 
lim Z(s, , t) = {(i+~ F(sn , t)) = [(P(t)). n-m 
(4.10) 
If now the strategy 8 is defined by 
Z(6, t) = uqt)), (4.11) 
it follows from (4.10) 
It = 1, 2, **., . 
and the properties of c$(z, t) that { Ji $[Z(s, , x)] kc}, 
d ~[z(~, ~)] dx;T; monotone decreasing sequence having the limit 
e reasonmg used m the precedmg section to show that 
E(a, t) = E(t) can now be used to show that F(G, t) = p(t), that is, that 6 has 
the property 
Z(6, t) = ((F(6, t)). (4.12) 
Paralleling our earlier argument, we now show that 6 is a uniquely optimal 
strategy. 
Let s be any strategy, and apply (4.5) to obtain 
F(o, t> - m 4 = 1: W(& x) - F(b, %>I 4[-qb, 4 xl 
- [Z(s, x) - F(s, 41 +[Z(s, x), xl> dx 
= s 1 W(s, x) - F(4 41 W’(s, x),4 (4.13) 
+ [Z(& x) - F(& 41 +[Z(k x), xl 
- [Z(s, 4 - F(k41 W(s, 4, xl> dx. 
In view of the definition of 1, Eq. (4.12) implies the relation 
[Z(6, t) - F(&, t)] +[Z(6, t), t] = rn:x [z - F(6, t)] $(z, t), (4.14) 
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whence 
[2(6, t) - F(6, t)] $[Z(6, t), t] - [Z(s, t) - F(6 t>l dL% 9, 4 2 0. (4.15) 
The hypotheses of Lemma 2 are thus satisfied withf(t) = F(B, t) - F(s, t), 
#(t) = - $[Z(B, t), t], e(t) equal to the left member of (4.15), and t(t) = 0. 
It follows that F(6, t) 2 F(s, t), with equality holding for t = t, only if 
[Z(s, t) - F(6, t)] $[Z(S, t), t] = [Z(k t> - F(k 01 Tw(~~ th 4 (4.16) 
for almost all lesser values of t. 
In view of (4.14) the condition (4.16) means that the left member must 
take on its maximum value. If the function has a unique maximum, as will 
usually be the case, it is given by Z(s, t) = Z(G, t); in any case the maximum 
will be attained for this choice. Thus with this slight qualification, 6 is the 
only optimal strategy, and we may state the result: 
THEOREM 6. There exists a strategy8 having the property Z(B, t) = [(F(c?, t} 
for t 2 0. The strategy 8 is optimal in the sense that F(s, t) < F(6, t) for any 
strategy s and all t 2 0. Moreover, F(s, to) = F(B, to) if and only ;f (4.16) 
is satisfied for almost all t in the interval 0 I t I t, . 
Now that this theorem is proved, it will be convenient to write F(t) and 
Z(t) for F(8, t) and Z(G, t) respectively. 
In terms of the notation (4.7) and in view of (4.12), Eq. (4.5) implies the 
relation 
F(t) = 1” G[F(x), x] dx. 
0 
(4.17) 
Defining f(z, t) = [z - F(t)] 4(x, t), we see that since F is continuous, f 
will be continuous in t for all z if $ is, that is, if e(a, t) is continuous in t for 
all z. If the further requirement that e(.z, t) should satisfy a uniform Lipschitz 
condition is imposed, G[F(t), t] = max,f(z, t) will also be continuous, and 
will therefore be the derivative of F(t). Also G[F(t), t] 2 0, and we have the 
analogue of Theorem 4: 
THEOREM 7. If e(z, t) satisjk a uniform Lipschitz condition in t for all z, 
the optimal expectation F(t) has the continuous nonnegative derivative F’(t) 
satisfying the equation 
F’(t) = G[F(t), t]. (4.18) 
It is interesting to consider again the example of a uniform distribution. 
Since $(z, t) = 1 - z for t 2 0, 0 2 x < 1 (and $(z, t) = 0 otherwise) we 
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have G(x, t) = max, (Z ~ X) (1 ~ z). The maximum is attained for 
z = <(x, t) = *(x I 1); thus G(x, t) m= i (1 ~ .~)a and (4.18) becomes 
F’(f) = 4 [I ~ F(t)]“. (4.19) 
From (4.19) we conclude 
F(t) = & , Z(t) = ([F(t)] = s. 
Comparing (4.20) with the result obtained earlier, we note that F(t) < E(t) 
for t > 0, as is to be expected, since the situation is less favorable for the 
seller. 
V. MULTIPLE ITEMS 
Let us now take up the more general situation where the seller’s initial 
stock consists of n items, rather than one. 
Starting with the case n = 2, note that once one item has been sold, the 
seller’s optimal strategy is the same as for a one-item sale; the only question 
to be settled is what the seller does if a buyer appears when both items are 
still on hand. 
Consider first the case where no selling price is announced, and a buyer 
appearing at time t makes an offer Z. If the offer is accepted, the seller receives 
the amount x, and his expected further receipts for the item still unsold are 
E(t). That is, his total expected gain, if the offer is accepted, is z + E(t). 
His situation is the same as it would be if he had a single item for sale and 
received this amount in payment for it. To be more precise, a two-item sale 
with the distribution function I~(z, t) is equivalent to a one-item sale with the 
distribution function 0’(z, t) = e(z - E(t), t). Accordingly, Theorems 2 and 3 
are applicable; they assure the existence of an optimal strategy and define 
its properties. 
To avoid confusion, it is convenient to denote the optimal expectation 
when two items are for sale at time t by Es(t), and the optimal expectation 
for one item, hitherto denoted by E(t), by E,(t). Similarly, the optimal 
expectation when the stock consists of 3, 4, ... items will be denoted by 
Jw), -%4(t), .-.* 
It follows from Theorems 2 and 3 that the optimum strategy is charac- 
terized by the property that an offer z at time t is accepted if x + E,(t) > Es(t), 
that is, if z 2 E,(t) - E,(t). 
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A suitable analogue of (3.16) is obtained by replacing E(t) by E,(t), z(y, X) 
bY X(YY 4 + Ed x , and B[E(x), X] by @E,(x) - El(x), x]. The result is > 
E2(t) = s: s:,,,,,,,,, ,231 
[z + w4 - -%(414Y A 
t m 
1 
ss (5.1) o E2(0)-E (2) Lx + E,(x) - E&)1 445 4 dx* 1 
This reasoning can be applied repeatedly to derive the optimal strategy 
for a stock of any number of items, leading to 
THEOREM 8. Let the initial stock consist of n items, and let the expectation 
(with prices not announced) from following the strategy s be E,(s, t) (k = 0, 1, 
2, *a-, n) if k items are in stock at time t. An optimal strategy is defined by the rule 
that if k items are in stock at time t, an ogler x made at that time will be accepted 
if and only if x satisfies the inequality 
x 2 s;p E&r t) - s;p ElcJs, t). (5.2) 
Any optimal strategy is identical with this except for a set of possible offers 
of probability zero. The optimal expectation E,(t) satisfies the equation 
En(t) = I: I:,, 
Lx + J%-dx) - -%(x)1 4 dx 
(2)-E -1(Z)] n n 
t m = ss o E,(r)-E,-1(2) 1~ + En-,(x) - Gk414W 4 dx- 
If 0(z, x) satisfies a uniform Lipschitz condition in t for all x 2 0, 
has a continuous nonnegative derivative EL(t) satisfying the relation 
(5.3) 
En(t) 
(5.4) 
Very similar reasoning is applicable to the case where a price is announced; 
the result is 
THEOREM 9. Let the initial stock consist of n items, let the expectation 
(with announced prices) from folloz&ag the strategy s be Fk(s, t) (k = 0, *a* n), 
if k items are in stock at time t, and let Fk( t) be the corresponding optimal expecta- 
tion. An optimal strategy is de&ted by the set of price functions 
-G(t) = b+p F&, t> - S;P F&s, 0, tl, (5.5) 
3 
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which specify the price to be charged if k = 1, ..., n items are in stock at time t. 
I f  the strategy s is optimal, its price functions ZL(s, t) satisfy the equations 
[-Us, 0 + F,-,(t) - F,(t)1 $[W, 4, tl = G[F/a-,tt) - F,(t), tl 
(k = 1, *.*, n) (5.6) 
for almost all t 2 0. The optimal expectation FJt) satisfies the equation 
F,(t) = !“ G[F,(x) - F&x), x] dx. (5.7) 
0 
If  8(x, t) satisjies a uniform Lipschitx condition in t for all x, F,(t) has the con- 
tinuous nonnegative derivative F;(t) satisfying the relation 
K(t) = G[F,z(t) - F&t), tl. W3) 
Note that (5.5) implies the formula 
&z(t) = 5[F,(t) - F&t), tl (n. = 1, 2, *se). (5.9) 
These results may be illustrated with an example. Let the distribution 
of offers be given by 
6(x, t) = 1 - e+ (5.10) 
for z 2 0, t 2 0. Then by (3.20) (or (5.4) for n = 1) we have 
[x - E,(t)] ecz dx; 
integrating the right member yields the differential equation 
E;(t) = emElft). (5.11) 
Since E,(O) = 0, (5.11) may be seen to have the solution 
or 
eElct) = t + 1 
E,(t) = In (t + 1). 
(5.12) 
(5.13) 
Repeating the same steps with n = 2, we get 
E;1( t) = exp [ - I&(t) + &(t)l. (5.14) 
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Substituting from (5.12) into (5.14), solving, and applying the condition 
E,(O) = 0 yields 
E,(t) = In [ 1 + t + (P/2)]. (5.15) 
Equations (5.13) and (5.15) suggest that the general formula is 
E,(t) = In (1 + t + *a* + P/n!); (5.16) 
this is readily verified by induction. Note incidentally that limn+m E,(t) = t, 
which is the expected total value of all offers made during a sale of length t. 
Let us compare these results with those obtained when prices are announ- 
ced. We have 
4(x, t) = 1 - e(z, t) = e-z, (5.17) 
and in order to proceed we must find the maximum of the expression 
(x - x) $(z, t) = (x - x) e-z. (5.18) 
The maximum can clearly be obtained by differentiating (5.18); it is attained 
for 
x = [(ix, t) = x + 1, (5.19) 
and has the value 
G(x, t) = e-f”+‘). (5.20) 
Substituting from (5.20) into (5.8) yields the set of differential equations 
K(t) = exp [- F,(t) + F,-,(t) - 11, n = 1, 2, a**. (5.21) 
The equations (5.21) are similar to those obtained in the preceding case; 
they have the solution 
F%(t) = In [l + (t/e) + me* + (l/n!) (t/e>“]. (5.22) 
The price functions may be determined by substituting from (5.22) into 
(5.9) taking account of (5.19); the result may be written 
z%(t) = 1 + F,(t) - F?z-‘(4 
= (?z = 1, 2, a**). (5.23) 
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VI. FURTHER PROPERTIES OF THE OPTIMAL STRATEGIES 
In this section attention will be confined to the situation where the distribu- 
tion of offers does not vary with time, and the notation will be modified 
accordingly; e.g., 0(x, t) will be written simply e(z). 
Before proceeding further, it is convenient to introduce the function 
a(Z) = 1: (z - 4 dQ4 = i:,,, MY) - 2) dy. (6.1) 
With this definition, (5.3) and (5.4) become 
E,(t) = f ~[En(x) - &&)I dx, 
0 
(6.2) 
E;(t) = cx[En(t) - E&t)]. (6.3) 
If there are n items in stock at time t, there is a probability, which will be 
denoted by RJt), that all the items will be sold if the optimal strategy is 
followed. There is an interesting relationship between the functions En and 
Rn. 
THEOREM 10. The relation 
CXt) = 40) [ 1 - R,(t)] (6.4) 
holds for n = 1, 2, a**, and t 2 0. 
PROOF. Consider a modification of the optimal strategy in which the 
time scale is translated by At; that is, an offer is accepted at time t if it would 
be accepted at time t + At under the optimal strategy. If At < 0, all offers 
are accepted between - At and 0. 
If At > 0, one may imagine the sale extended by At beyond its termination 
at t = 0, in which case the seller’s expectation would be E,(t + At). To 
find his actual expectation, this must be diminished by the portion attributable 
to the “overtime” period. 
If the seller has k items for sale at the beginning of this period, his expected 
gain during the period is E,(At). If k 2 1, it follows from (6.3) that one may 
write 
&(A t) = E;(O) At + O(A t)” = m(O) At + O(A t)*, (6.5) 
while if K = 0, E,(At) = 0. The probability that at least one item remains for 
sale at the end of the period by definition 1 - R,(t + At); consequently, the 
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probability that one remains at the beginning is I - R,(t + dt) + O(dt). 
Reasoning similar to that used in establishing Theorem 1 leads to the relation 
= [R,-,(t) - qt)] f+dt 4[-%(x) - %-&)I dx + W02s (6.6) 
t 
and since R,(t), RnY1(t), and $[E,(x) - &-r(x)], being probabilities, must 
be between 0 and 1, we conclude that R,(t + dt) = R,(t) + O(dt). Com- 
bining all these considerations, we see that the expectation under the modified 
strategy is 
E,(t + At) - cd(O) [ 1 - R,(t)] dt + O(k)2 
= E,(t) + {l&(t) - a(0) [l - &$(t)]>or + CW2 (6.7) 
If At < 0, the expectation is the sum of E,(t + At) and the expectation 
for a period of length 1 At 1 during which any offer is accepted if an item 
remains for sale. This latter expectation is seen to be (1 - R,(t)) a(0) (- At), 
and we again conclude that the expectation is given by (6.7). 
Since E,(t) is the expectation from the optimal strategy, the expression 
(6.7) must attain its maximum for At = 0, which can be true only if the 
coefficient of At vanishes. But the vanishing of this coefficient is equivalent 
to (6.4); thus the theorem is established. 
Very similar reasoning can be applied to the case of announced prices. 
Since F,(O) = 0 for 12 = 1, 2, se*, we have by (5.9) Z,(O) = b(O) for all IZ. 
If this price were maintained for a time interval At, the expected number 
of buyers during the interval would be $[[(O)] At + O(At)2, and 
hence the expected receipts, if there were an item for sale, would be 
t;(O) $[c(O)] At + O(At)2, which by definition equals G(0) At + O(At)2. Also, 
from (4.18) 
&.(A t) = F;(O) d t + O(A t)2 = G(0) At + O(A t)2 (64 
for k = 1, 2, a*.. Denoting by Sri(t) the probability that n items held at time t 
are all disposed of, we obtain the following analogue of Theorem 10: 
THEOREM 11. The rektion 
C’G) = 0) [l - W>l (6.9) 
holds for n = 1,2, *** and t 2 0. 
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Comparing (6.4) with (6.3) and (6.9) with (5.8), leads to the identities 
a(O) [l ~ 4l(f)l = 44(t) - G--l(t)1 (6.10) 
G(O) [I - h(t)1 = GEZ;,,(Q - Fn-,(t)l, (6.1 1) 
which hold for t 2 0 and n = 1, 2, .**. 
These last relationships exhibit a parallelism between the cases of un- 
announced and announced prices, and also suggest that the properties of the 
functions LX and G are worth examining. 
To begin with, we note that (6.1) is equivalent to 
~(2) = s m &i) dx, (6.12) Z 
as may be seen upon integration by parts. This shows that a(Z) is monotone 
decreasing for 2 2 0, and is strictly decreasing for all 2 such that 4(Z) > 0. 
Also, it possesses right and left derivatives, which are equal except for a 
countable number of points (the discontinuities of 4(Z)), and are both mono- 
tone increasing. 
It will now be shown that G(Z) has similar properties. 
It is convenient to defineg(z, X) = (z - X) +(z). Then G(X) = maxzg(x, X) 
and t(x) = [inf z 1 g(z, X) = G(x)]. We shall also introduce 
T(X) = [sup z I g(z, x> = G(x)]. 
Some difficulties arise if d(x) = 0 or if 4(z) = 0 for all z > X, since then 
g(,z, X) 5 0 for x 2 0 and g(z, x) = 0 for z 2 X. It will be convenient to 
define l(x) = X, v(x) = x + 1 in these cases. Although they will be ignored 
in the following discussion, it may readily be verified that the results stated 
remain true. Note that with these definitions g(x, X) = 0 and hence c(x) 2 x 
and v(x) > x for all x > 0; moreover t(x) > x unless $(z) = 0 for all z > X. 
LEMMA 5. The function 7 is monotone increasing and right continuous. 
PROOF. The argument used in the proof of Lemma 4 to show that 5 is 
monotone increasing applies equally to 7. 
To show that 7 is right continuous, let z0 = lims+rO+,, v(x) be the right- 
hand limit of T(X) at x = xa. Then since g(z, x) 5 G(x) = g(T(x), X) and g 
is continuous in x for x 2 0, z 2 0, we have 
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As in the proof of Lemma 4, the inequality (6.13), together with the mono- 
tonicity of T(X), implies that 7(x,,) = z,, and thus that 7 is right continuous. 
From the definitions of l(x) and T(X) and Lemmas 4 and 5 it is clear that 
c(x) < T(X) for all X, with equality holding except for a countabIe number 
of values of X. 
LEMMA 6. The functions ~[Qx)] and 4[~( x )] are respectively left and right 
continuous. 
PROOF. The left continuity of +[[(x)] follows from the left continuity of 
+ and 5 and the monotonicity of 5. 
To see that C&-~(X)] is right continuous, note that if 0 5 x,, < x we have 
the chain of inequalities 
Since 
it follows that 
that is, that 
Since q(x) is rightcontinuous and 7(x0) - x,, > 0, (6.14) can only be true if 
lim z+TO+O +[v(x)] = $[q(xa)], that is, if +[~(x)] is right continuous. 
Incidentally, this argument shows that G is right continuous; it is easily 
seen to be left continuous, and is thus continuous. 
THEOREM 12. The functioti G(x) has the Zeft derivative 
G-64 = - w&41 
and the right derivative 
G+(x) = - +hb91 
for all x > 0. 
PROOF. Suppose 0 < x < x,,. Then we have 
(6.15) 
(6.16) 
G(x) - G&J = g(W, 4 - d&G xc,> g g(W, 4 - g(t;(x>, xo> 
= (x0 - 4 mb91; 
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also 
GM - (3x0) 2 id5(roh 4 - di(xo)a ~0) = (xo - 4 +[5hJl~ 
Hence 
- c#+gx)] I9 - G(xo) I - g&Y,)], ~__ 
x - x0 
(6.17) 
and on applying Lemma 6, taking the limit of (6.17) as x --+ x0 - 0, we see 
that (6.15) is verified. 
Writing G(X) - G(x,) = g(q(x), X) - g(q(xo), x0) with 0 5 x0 < x and 
following similar reasoning establishes (6.16). 
Note that the right and left derivatives are both monotone increasing and 
can differ only at a countable number of points. 
COROLLARY. The function G may be expressed in either of the form 
(6.18) 
For convenience, we shall write $[c(z)] = #(z); thus (6.12) has the ana- 
logue 
G(Z) = ,I I&) dz. (6.19) 
Comparing (6.12) with (6.19), and (6.3) with (5.8), we conclude that the 
expected gain from a sale without announced prices with a distribution of 
offers given by I,&) will be the same as for a sale with anndtmced prices and a 
distribution of offers given by 4(z). 
For example, if 4(x) = e-” for z 2 0, we have, as noted earlier, 
t;(x) = x + 1, and consequently $(z) = e++l) = (l/e) e-2. This distribu- 
tion could be derived from the previous one by eliminating all but a fraction 
l/e of the buyers, and would thus correspond to changing the time scale in 
the same proportion. Comparing (5.22) with (5.16), we see that this is indeed 
the relationship of E,(t) with F,(t). 
It follows from these remarks that to every example with announced prices 
there corresponds a mathematically equivalent one without announced 
prices. Consequently any properties that the functions E, can be shown to 
possess will also be possessed by the functions F,,. 
It is convenient to define 
k(t) = E,(t) - &-l(t), n = 1, 2, ***, t > 0, (6.20) 
with the understanding that E,,(t) = 0. 
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It is intuitively apparent that I&(t) increases with t for n = 1, 2, **a and 
decreases with n for all t > 0. This result may be stated formally as 
THEOREM 13. The inequalities D;(t) > 0 and D%(t) > Dn+l(t) hold for 
n = 1,2, a-, and t > 0. 
PROOF. Proceeding by induction, we note first that a[E,(t)] > 0 for all 
t > 0, since the probability that the sale price is greater than the expected 
receipts must be positive. Hence by (6.3) 
D;(t) = E;(t) = a[E,(t)] > 0. (6.21) 
Now suppose IILl > 0 for some n 2 2 and all t > 0. By (6.3) 
BA( t) = E;(t) - E;L-I( t) = a[&(t)l - 4& -d91* (6.22) 
If I&(t) 2 D,-,(t), it follows from (6.22) and the properties of 01 that Di( t) I 0 
and hence that DLr(t) - D,(t) 2 &-r(t) > 0. It follows from part (b) of 
Lemma 3 with f(t) = DnM1( t) - Dn(t) that Dnel(t) - D,(t) > 0 for t 2 0, 
and hence that D;(t) > 0 unless ar[&(t)] = oLIDnFl(t)] = 0. Since 
DLr(t) = a[D,&t)] - a[D,&t)], the latter possibility would contradict 
the assumption that IILl > 0. 
By induction D;(t) > 0 for n = 1, 2, *e*; the second part of the conclusion 
follows by rewritting (6.22) with n replaced by n + 1. 
A final result of this kind is stated without proof. It may be proved by 
means of Lemma 3 and the properties of 01. 
THEOREM 14. I f  for some n 2 1, T 2 0, and h 2 0, the equality 
D,(T) = LI,+~(T + h) holds, then Dn(t) > Dn+l(t + h) for all t > 7. 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A number of lines of further inquiry are suggested by the foregoing dis- 
cussion. 
First, many interesting questions can be raised about the behavior of the 
functions E,(t) and other related functions. It would be particularly desirable 
to obtain asymptotic formulas for large values of n. 
Second, generality would be gained by permitting the buyer to purchase 
more than one item, and by allowing the stock to consist of more than one 
kind of goods, A variety of assumptions could be made about the distributions 
of buyers’ offers in this case. 
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Finally, it seems apparent that the principles developed above could be 
applied to the case where the seller can replenish his stock at various times 
during the sale. It would be especially interesting to see whether the treatment 
could be extended to the case of a continuing business. 
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